Bolivian Lawfare and Peru Indications
A Busy Start to 2023
Bolivian Lawfare
The arrest of the Governor of Santa Cruz, Luis Fernando Camacho, by the Arce administration signals a new phase in its ongoing conflict with the opposition in Bolivia. Described as a “kidnapping” by his supporters, Camacho was arrested by plainclothes officers who intercepted his vehicle on the way home from the office. Camacho is now in 3 months of pre-trial confinement in La Paz awaiting trial on charges of terrorism, carrying out a coup, bribery and sedition. All these stem from his actions leading nationwide protests against the results of the 2019 elections. These protests, against alleged election fraud, led to then-President Evo Morales resigning and fleeing the country.
Readers may also recall Camacho was the leader of the recent “census” strike in Santa Cruz I wrote about in the Nov 2022 edition.
This is not the first time the Arce administration has used the legal system against political figures. Jeanine Anez, the former Senator who became President following Morales’ resignation in 2019, was arrested in 2021 on charges of terrorism, sedition and conspiracy. She maintains that she did nothing wrong and only took office after all persons ahead of her in the line of Presidential succession (all MAS party members) resigned. She was convicted and sentenced to ten years in prison in 2022 for making "decisions contrary to the constitution" and"dereliction of duty.” For those wanting to go very much down a rabbit hole on how the Bolivian Justice system acted to ensure a guilty verdict, Anez’s Wikipedia page has an exhaustive and well-footnoted play-by-play.
Following Camacho’s arrest, there were two weeks of violent protests and road blockages in Santa Cruz. These actions were halted when the Santa Cruz Civic Committee called a “National Assembly” of opposition members to determine further actions to counter the Arce administration’s repression.
The assemblies took place across Bolivia on 25 January. The main outcomes were a call for a new amnesty law within 30 days to free Camacho and an estimated 180 other political prisoners, the formation of a unified opposition party for the 2025 general elections, and the collection of 1.5 million signatures on a petition asking for judicial reform.
Fighting fire with fire, the opposition seems to recognize that legal means are the best course against the Arce administration. The question remains if the existing system is unbiased enough to allow changes to be made. I am less than optimistic change will come easily.
Peru Update
At the end of my last edition, I listed a number of indications to watch. In the time since publication, a number of them have come to pass. Here’s a short list of the most impactful:
The Economy
Mine closures: Three mines have been attacked by protesters and one has closed due to attacks. Other mines are reducing operations due to supply shortages caused by road blockades.
Two workers’ unions have called for a national strike on 30 January
Supply shortages: Prices for basic needs have doubled, natural gas canisters are unavailable in multiple locations due to road blockages, and medical supplies are so short that the Peruvian Air Force has airlifted supplies to the city of Madre de Dios
Security Forces
Additional mass casualty protest responses: While there has been one protester death in Lima, the security responses to demonstrations in Lima and road blockage clearances in Southern Peru have proceeded with greatly increased restraint by Security Forces. This is a positive sign of the Boularte administration’s ability to control and direct these forces.
Boularte Administration
Blaming of “illegal miners and narcotraffickers” for protests: President Boularte in a nationally televised news conference has expanded her list of bad actors to include contraband traffickers. She did not, however, give any evidence.
Increased statements about the role of Bolivia, specifically former President Morales, in destabilizing Southern Peru: President Boularte specifically identified a pro-Morales group, the Red Ponchos, as a source for arms and ammunition used in the protests. The Peruvian government has already declared Morales and a number of his ex-officials as “persona non grata” due to their alleged destabilizing efforts. Morales has hired ex-President Castillo’s lawyer to represent him in Peru during the Federal investigation of these allegations.
On a positive note: The Boularte administration has greatly improved and increased its public relations campaign (or information operation) to frame the issues and show other regional governments that they will not passively take criticism.
Peruvian Congress
Opposition parties blocking legislative efforts: On 27 January, an effort to move up Peruvian elections to October 2023 was soundly defeated. A follow-up effort to pass the change was approved on 30 January by a single vote. The motion now moves to open debate and another vote on 15 February.
Votes to impeach Boularte: On 25 January, a motion to impeach President Boularte received 28 signatures to move forward for consideration. The motion needed 26 to move forward and needs 52 votes to move to full debate. Although the measure barely made it, the fact it did is concerning.
Taken together, these overall negative indicators lead me to believe that Peru is up for continued unrest. This article from the Economist (English) (Spanish) gives an excellent summary of the current situation. I would recommend caution to travelers and businesses looking to start new projects.
Thanks for reading!